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Abstract 
In March 2000 in Lisbon, EU heads of state and government set the strategic goal to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. These goals were confirmed at the 
Barcelona European Council, which added that investment in European R&D should be increased to 3% 
of GDP by 2010.  
This Working Document argues that the weakness of R&D and the slow accumulation of knowledge in 
the EU is probably a major reason why Europe has failed to catch up with the US productivity 
performance during recent decades. But the emphasis of the Barcelona Council on the spending target 
for R&D could be misplaced as the question is not so much one of increasing the level but rather of 
enhancing the efficiency of R&D in Europe. Thus it is important to understand how countries compare 
in their abilities to encourage greater levels of knowledge, and asks why the countries vary in their 
abilities to turn R&D into innovative and commercial products through the creation of new, successful 
companies (and consequently more employment).  
After an examination of various potential constraints on innovative entrepreneurship, efforts towards the 
enforcement of competition policy, the introduction of a European patent, adaptations of the tax systems 
in favour of entrepreneurship, a reduction of red tape, the adaptation of bankruptcy rules and the easing 
of finance for new ventures are all welcome measures. Nevertheless, actively subsidising investment by 
venture capitalists may not necessarily deliver the desired results. Consequently, policy measures aimed 
at enhancing the efficiency and productivity of R&D in Europe should focus on the level of knowledge 
of workers and the capacity of entrepreneurs to translate scientific excellence into viable technological 
innovation.  
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FOREWORD 
JØRGEN MORTENSEN 
AND 
DANIEL GROS* 
The Barcelona R&D targets 
In March 2000 in Lisbon, EU heads of state and government set the strategic goal to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. The 
Lisbon conclusions also outlined what was presented as a new working method: the open 
method of coordination (OMC) designed to bring about a high degree of convergence of 
member states’ policies in fields not covered by the traditional common policies such as, 
notably, fiscal policy and social policy but also a number of other policies normally reserved 
for national competences. Policies supporting and stimulating R&D constitute a prominent 
example of the latter.
1 
The Lisbon targets were confirmed at the Barcelona European Council in March 2002. 
Furthermore, the latter Council meeting agreed that investment in European research and 
development (R&D) must be increased to 3% of GDP by 2010, with at least two-thirds of the 
total investment coming from the private sector. This goal is intended to focus the attention of 
the Commission and member states on the reforms necessary to deliver not only higher but 
also more productive business investment. To achieve this objective, the Commission in its 
recommendation for the 2002 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) for the economic 
policies of the member states and the Community called for better incentives for firms to 
invest in R&D while preserving sound fiscal policies. 
In September 2002, the Commission adopted the Communication entitled More Research for 
Europe: Towards 3% of GDP (European Commission, 2002) with recommendations for 
member states, industry and other stakeholders for achieving the 3% objective. The Brussels 
European Council in March 2003 reinforced the member states’ commitment to the Barcelona 
objective and called for concrete action to attain the 3% target and for strengthening of the 
European Research and Innovation Area to the benefit of all in the enlarged EU. Finally, in a 
Communication on Investing in Research: An Action Plan for Europe (European 
Commission, 2003) in June 2003 the Commission outlined a series of detailed steps to be 
taken at the level of the EU, member states or even regions in pursuit of the Barcelona target. 
The weakness of R&D in the EU: A diagnosis 
As Laura Botazzi highlights in this Working Document, the weakness of R&D and the slow 
accumulation of knowledge in the EU is probably a major reason for the unsatisfactory 
productivity performance during recent decades. 
In fact, most or all available indicators on the level of R&D confirm that the EU as a whole is 
lagging seriously behind other OECD countries, notably the United States and Japan. Thus, 
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1 For an assessment of the potential of the OMC see Gràinne de Búrca and Jonathan Zeitlin (2003). ii | FOREWORD 
on average for the period 1995-99, total R&D expenditure in the EU amounted to about 1.8% 
of GDP as against some 2.5% in the US and close to 3% in Japan. With respect to private 
R&D expenditure the relative difference was even larger, with the EU at around 1% of GDP 
compared with nearly 2% in Japan and the US. 
The gap between Japan and the US on one side and the EU on the other was equally striking 
when measured by the number of researchers. In fact, over the same period the number of 
researchers amounted overall to some 0.5% of employment in the EU as against 0.8% in the 
US and close to 1% in Japan. The number of researchers in the business sector was only some 
0.2% in the EU or about a third of the level in Japan and the US. As far as patent intensity 
(the number of patents during a year per thousand persons employed) is concerned, the EU is 
also seriously lagging behind when measured by the number of patents registered in the (most 
important) US Patent and Trademark Office. 
While the European R&D intensity on average lags behind Japan and the US, the detailed 
country-by-country data show huge differences between the north and the south of Europe. 
Among the EU member states, Finland and Sweden appear to be in a class of their own, with 
a research intensity in the same range as in Japan and the US. The high level of the 
Scandinavian countries (also including Norway) contrasts sharply with the low level seen in 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In this respect the new member state Poland is in the same 
category as the Mediterranean countries. Other EU member states (Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany and the UK) are in a more favourable situation that the latter group, but 
typically show research intensity at roughly half the level of Japan and the US.  
According to Bottazzi, the low research intensity in the EU is not in the main owing to a high 
share of industries with a low intensity of research (composition effect) but essentially the 
result of a low level of R&D in all branches of the economy. Digging further into the analysis 
of the nature and effects of the low R&D intensity, she shows convincingly that the low 
intensity of research gradually translates into a low level of accumulated knowledge. 
Using the cumulated number of patents (with each patent weighed with the average yearly 
number of citations that a patent posted with the US Patent Office receives in its first three 
years of existence) as a proxy for the production of innovation, she calculates an index for 
knowledge per worker accumulated during the 1973-96 period for a number of OECD 
countries. According to these estimates, the knowledge capital per worker more than trebled 
in the US and Japan from 1972 to 1995 while it rose much less in the EU countries. Although 
the US and Japan maintained their leadership, the dispersion of the indices fell moderately, 
indicating a certain catching-up by EU countries such as Spain and Finland, which initially 
had a very low level of knowledge capital. 
Bottazzi then turns to decomposing the average creation of new ideas as measured by “patent 
productivity” into three components: 1) expenditure on R&D per worker in R&D; 2) stock of 
patents per worker in R&D; and 3) a general productivity-enhancing factor in R&D creation. 
She concludes that within the EU, certain member states (notably Denmark and Finland) 
obtain more innovation than other member states from a given level of R&D. By including 
the stock of ‘world knowledge’, she finds a strong impact on domestic innovation in a number 
of countries, an observation that confirms the findings of a number of other studies of the 
productivity of R&D expenditure (in terms of innovation). Consequently, the main problem 
for most (major) EU countries is not the level of R&D but the capacity to translate scientific 
excellence into viable technological innovation. R&D AND THE FINANCING OF IDEAS IN EUROPE | iii 
Bottazzi agrees that the scarcity of risk capital and of venture capital in particular may harm 
the innovative ability of start-ups. Venture capital has been shown to benefit start-ups beyond 
the supply of finance. In other words, there is a ‘soft’ side to venture capital that adds value to 
the ‘hard’ financial side: venture capitalists are often a ‘coach’ for entrepreneurial start-ups. 
At least in the US, venture capital adds to national innovative capabilities by affecting both 
the efficiency of the knowledge-production function (more and better patents per given 
inputs) and the overall total factor productivity. There is not such evidence, however, for 
Europe. In fact, in Europe venture capital investment in the early stages of ventures is only 
one-fifth of what is invested in the US. Furthermore, nearly half of the funds come from 
banks and established companies, while in the US venture firms are most often small 
independent partnerships working more closely with the management of the firms in which 
they invest. This seems to confirm that venture capital investment in Europe is much less 
‘adventurous’ than in the US. 
Concluding from an examination of various potential constraints on innovative 
entrepreneurship, Bottazzi argues that enforcing competition policy, introducing a European 
patent, adapting the tax systems in favour of entrepreneurship, reducing red tape, adapting 
bankruptcy rules and easing finance for new ventures are all welcome measures. She argues, 
however, that actively subsidising investment by venture capitalists may not necessarily 
deliver the desired results. In fact a large part of European venture capital finds its way to the 
American capital market and thus does not benefit innovation in Europe. 
Consequently, policy measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency and productivity of R&D in 
Europe should therefore particularly focus on the level of knowledge of workers and the 
capacity of entrepreneurs to translate scientific excellence into viable technological 
innovation. 
Assessing the action plan for investing in research 
The action plan presented by the Commission in June 2003 included four main sets of actions, 
comprising a total of 46 new initiatives, including: 
•  steps to enhance the coordination of policies through active use of the open method of 
coordination and the creation of European ‘technology platforms’ (five new initiatives); 
•  strengthening the quantity and quality of the flow of human resources into research (23 
new initiatives); 
•  redirecting public spending towards research and innovation (six new initiatives); and 
•  improving framework conditions for private investment in research through adaptation of 
intellectual property rules, regulation of products and standardisation, competition rules 
and adaptation of the financial and fiscal environment (12 new initiatives). 
As stressed by Bottazzi, all or most of these measures would be welcome and useful steps to 
build up the momentum of innovation in the EU. Yet among the 46 new initiatives listed in 
the action plan, very few, if any, actually involve the proposal and implementation of 
common policies. Although it should be noted that a number of cases subject to the open 
method of coordination policies are mainly within the exclusive competence of member states 
and must be both decided and implemented within the framework of national competences. iv | FOREWORD 
The Commission is thus on the whole restricted to efforts that “encourage those that are 
willing to improve the conditions to do more and better research in Europe”.
2 
An issue to consider is whether the relative inefficiency of European R&D is not to a 
considerable extent the result of the segmentation of public research efforts and overlapping 
of competing research programmes, and thus underutilisation of the available human 
resources. Beyond doubt the 6
th Framework Programme constitutes a powerful tool in the 
endeavour to streamline research and promote cross-frontier collaboration and a certain 
degree of integration of research projects. Nevertheless, the total resources of the 6
th 
Framework Programme only amount to some 5% of the total public spending on research in 
the EU and thus can only exert marginal influence on the structure and direction of research. 
Therefore the time has now come to create an integrated EU market for research and 
researchers as already proposed by the Commission a decade ago. 
                                                 
2 Extract from the conclusions of European Commission (2003). | 1 
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Introduction 
A possible culprit of Europe’s poor economic performance is its research achievements, i.e. 
the production of innovative ideas and the translation of these ideas into productivity. At the 
microeconomic level, innovation allows firms to respond to more sophisticated consumer 
demand and to stay ahead of their competitors. Recent innovation surveys (European 
Commission, 2001) for 12 European countries show that almost 35% of the annual revenues 
in the manufacturing sector are derived from new and improved products. 
At the macroeconomic level, innovation contributes to the three drivers of output growth: 
capital, labour and total factor productivity (TFP). A country’s innovative capacity is 
therefore important for the creation of growth and new employment for the country itself.  
Product and process innovation, however, which transforms scientific and technological ideas 
into new products and processes, is very hard to measure. Common measures include inputs, 
such as R&D expenditure or personnel, and (intermediate) outputs, e.g. patents or citations. 
While innovation increases the quality of physical capital, research has started to look at the 
link between innovation and TFP. Recent empirical studies (European Commission, 2001) 
document that the correlation between innovation and productivity is statistically weak if we 
consider direct measures of R&D (expenditure, R&D personnel as a share of the labour force, 
patents and publications per inhabitant), but becomes significant if we look at ‘structural’ 
measures such as PCs or internet connections per inhabitant, the share of firms engaged in 
cooperative agreements and with a continuous engagement in research and countries’ 
knowledge.  
Since knowledge (which we measure with the stock of a country’s patents that are registered 
in the US, weighted by citations) is an important determinant of TFP, and therefore of the 
differences in growth rates not accounted for by changes in the accumulation of physical and 
human capital, we think it is important to understand how countries differ in their ability to 
create new knowledge. In sections 2 and 3, we start by looking at the differences in R&D 
among countries and we then ask, in sections 4 and 5, why countries differ in their ability to 
turn R&D into innovation and into commercial products through the creation of new, 
successful firms and employment. In section 6 we identify the organisation and the financing 
of European research as likely candidates to explain Europe’s poor economic performance. 
1.  R&D in Europe 
We start by looking at research expenditure in Europe. Figure 1 presents four different 
measures of research intensity for Europe, Japan and the US during the period 1995-99. 2 | LAURA BOTAZZI 
Figure 1. Research intensity indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Private R&D (BERD) refers to expenditure on R&D performed and funded by business enterprises 
(OECD Main Science and Technology Indicator); Total R&D (GERD) is the total R&D spending 
(OECD Main Science and Technology Indicator). Private researchers are R&D research scientists and 
engineers employed in business enterprises; total researchers refer to the total number of R&D research 
scientists and engineers (OECD Main Science and Technology Indicator); and the number of workers is 
OECD total employment (OECD national accounts, main aggregates). The four different measures of 
research intensity have been considered during the period 1995-1999; the figures represent their average. 
 
Figure 2. Researchers as a fraction of the work force 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Total refers to the total research scientists and engineers as a fraction of the total force; private sector 
represents only those who both work in and are funded by the business sector. For further details (source 
of data, period covered), see Notes in Figure 1.  
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For both the expenditure-based and the employment-based measures of R&D Figure 1 shows 
the research done in all sectors as well as private sector research in the period 1995-99. While 
Japan is ahead of the US according to expenditure-based and the employment-based 
measures, Europe is consistently third. Not only this. The fraction of private R&D 
expenditure over total expenditure is lower than in the US and Japan. 
Figure 2 focuses on the employment-based measures of R&D across 21 countries. The shaded 
bars show total research scientists and engineers as a fraction of the total labour force, while 
the light bars show only those who work and are funded by the business sector. It is clear 
from the picture that we see a lot of variation between the US and Europe, but also among the 
EU countries we do not see homogeneity, especially in the private sector: public expenditure 
in R&D is higher in the peripheral EU countries – especially Portugal, Greece and Poland. 
If we look at the resources spent by countries on R&D, we have a similar picture. Table 1 
shows that Europe on average devotes a smaller share of its resources to R&D than does 
either the US or Japan. The third column of Table 1 reports the employment of researchers 
divided by total employment as a measure of research intensity. Here the EU again comes 
after the US and Japan. But figures for the EU overall mask considerable variability within its 
membership. Some European countries, such as Germany, Sweden and Finland, appear to be 
important innovators as measured by either research intensity or patenting intensity. 
Table 1. Research and patent intensity, 1999 
Country  GDP per worker  Researchers in 
business 
Research 
intensity 
(%) 
Patent intensity 
(EPO) 
Patent intensity 
(USPTO)* 
Belgium $62,854  16,476  0.410 0.318 0.171 
Denmark $52,926  9,081 0.328 0.290 0.169 
Finland $53,532  17,309  0.770  0.608  0.349 
France $59,083  75,390  0.320  0.299  0.167 
Germany $53,154  150,150  0.394 0.536 0.298 
Italy $60,807  26,192  0.115  0.160  0.078 
Netherlands $52,756  19,359  0.244  0.362  0.165 
Spain $49,605  15,178  0.100  0.047  0.019 
Sweden $51,792  22,822  0.548  0.509  0.421 
UK $47,861  92,133  0.318  0.189  0.138 
EU $53,154  466,600  0.284  0.287  0.165 
US $62,680  1,015,700  0.691  0.191  0.625 
Japan $47,365  433,758  0.650  0.262  0.474 
Australia $54,234  15,506 0.174 0.099 0.093 
Canada $54,592  49,500  0.333  0.101  0.261 
Norway  $58,125  9,737 0.424 0.155 0.120 
Notes: *Data are for 1998; GDP is translated to current dollars by OECD using their PPPs (source of data: 
OECD national accounts, main aggregates). The number of workers is OECD total employment (national 
accounts, main aggregates). Researchers in business are R&D research scientists and engineers employed 
in business enterprises; the series is expressed in full time equivalent (FTE) (OECD main science and 
technology indicator). Research intensity is business enterprise researchers over total employment. 
Patenting intensity is the number of patent applications to either the EPO (Monaco) or the USPTO (US) 
per 1,000 workers in the inventor’s country (source of data: OECD main science and technology 
indicator). 4 | LAURA BOTAZZI 
Clearly, it becomes interesting to shed light on the possible reasons for such cross-country 
variation. One potential explanation lies in the cross-country variation in industry 
composition.
3 Since industries vary widely in their reliance on research, a country’s high 
research intensity might well reflect its specialisation in research-intensive industries. To 
disentangle the role of overall level effects versus an industry composition effect, we 
decompose total research intensity (business enterprise research scientists and engineers as a 
fraction of employment in country c) denoted by rc as: 
rc -rw = Σi(sic-siw)riw + Σi(ric-riw)siw + Σi(ric-riw)(sic-siw) (1) 
where rw is the research intensity across countries, sic is the employment share of industry i in 
country c, siw is the share of industry i in the employment of all countries, ric is the research 
intensity in industry i in country c and riw is research intensity in industry i over all countries 
(i is the number of industries).  
We then divide the difference between country c research intensity and the world average into 
three components: i) the composition effect, how much employment in country c is weighted 
towards research-intensive activities, ii) the intensity effect, how much country c is relatively 
research intensive across all industries and iii) the interaction effect, measuring how much c’s 
industry composition is tilted towards industries in which it is unusually research intensive. 
Figure 3. Level effects and industry composition effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The industries that have been considered are: chemical linked (food products, beverages, tobacco; 
textiles; rubber and plastics); earth linked (wood, paper, printing, publishing; coke, refined petroleum; 
other non metals; miscellaneous); chemical; metal and metal products; machinery; electrical and 
transportation. For each industry the total number of workers (OECD STAN database for industrial 
analysis) and the total number of researchers (OECD Basic Science and Technology Statistics) have been 
used to produce series. For Germany, data on researchers are available only for odd years. We simply 
averaged the previous and the following odd year to fill in missing even years. The relative research 
intensity refers to the difference between country i research intensity (total number of researchers over 
total employment for the seven industries have been considered) and the ‘world’ average. It has been 
decomposed in three different effects following Eaton et al. (1998): the composition effect, the intensity 
effect and the interaction effect. The relative research intensity can also be obtained through the algebraic 
sum of those effects. Data refer to the period 1995-99. 
                                                 
3 See Eaton et al. (1998). 
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Figure 3 reports this decomposition for seven countries across seven industries in the period 
1995-99. Each country has four bars. Results show that in general the cross-country pattern of 
overall research intensity is explained by the intensity effect, i.e. by how much a country is 
research intensive across all industries. Therefore, to understand why some countries emerge 
as research centres we need to understand why they do more research overall. 
2.  Research and patenting 
We believe that one of the possible causes of the difference in R&D expenditure among 
countries rests on their possibility to access cutting-edge knowledge. We think of knowledge 
as a particular form of capital, which is accumulated due to innovation, depreciates with 
obsolescence and needs some inputs to be created.
4 The inputs of our ‘production function of 
innovation’ (Bottazzi and Peri, 2002) are R&D resources, human ‘brains’ and the stock of 
existing ideas:
5 
A(t)   - A(t) D(t)) & R     (S = dA(t)
1 δ
α α −  (2) 
 
The two factors identified as the inputs in the production of new ideas are R&D(t), the total 
expenditure in R&D or total number of skilled workers employed in R&D and A(t), the total 
stock of existing useful ideas that could be used to improve on existing knowledge.    δ is the 
obsolescence parameter and S is a shift parameter that measures the national productive 
capacity of making R&D more productive. The production function of new ideas can also be 
written as: 
α α δ
− +
1 A(t) D(t)) & R      (S =    
A(t)
A
d
 (3) 
 
We construct the stock of knowledge, i.e. of ideas A(t), using patent counts and to correct for 
the uneven importance of different ideas, we weight by the average yearly number of citations 
a patent receives in its first three years.  
The decision to identify the new ideas with patents can be considered restrictive from two 
different perspectives, the first being that not all ideas are patented and we measure only a 
subset of the whole production of innovation. This is a well-known critique that applies to 
most of this literature. Nevertheless, there is no comparable measure of the flow of 
commercially relevant ideas across time and countries that can be used. 
The second limitation is owing to the fact that we consider only international patents, i.e. the 
patents granted by the US patent office to foreign firms. This choice should not lead to the 
                                                 
4 Difficulties arise from the lack of consensus on how to measure knowledge, from the less than precise data on 
R&D inputs, and from absence of any theoretical prediction on what aggregate returns to scale should be in this 
case. In the extant literature the only specific contributions to the estimation of a production function of ideas 
across countries or regions are those of Porter and Stern (2000), Bottazzi and Peri (2001) and Porter, Stern and 
Furman (2001). We follow Bottazzi and Peri, and estimate the returns to factors in generating new ideas in the 
way in which returns to factors in the aggregate production function are usually estimated. 
5 The data on (time-equivalent) research employees and on spending in R&D (in constant dollars) are from the 
ANBERD and OECD databases. The data on total employment are from OECD. 6 | LAURA BOTAZZI 
conclusion that we consider locally patented ideas as less relevant, but that international 
patents can be used as an overall index of innovation activity.  
Since patenting in the United States costs a company more than patenting in its own country, 
the usual presumption is that only the most valuable ideas are patented in this country. 
Moreover, with the United States being the largest and most competitive market in the world, 
the inventions with a potentially profitable content are all patented at its patent office. Hence 
the flow of new, innovative ideas that become international patents are only those whose 
novelty exceeds the novelty of the knowledge reached in the world (i.e. the world knowledge 
frontier). 
The evolution of knowledge generated in each country should lead countries that benefit from 
a larger pool of ideas ‘in the air’ to produce more new ideas, for given resources, and to 
exhibit higher innovation rates. In Figure 4 we plot the time behaviour of knowledge stock per 
employee in the 15 largest patent-producing countries, which account for 96% of the world 
patenting. 
When we take into consideration the dispersion across levels of knowledge per worker, the 
standard deviation of the distribution has decreased from 1.08 in 1973 to 0.86 in 1998. Those 
countries such as Spain and Finland, which start with low levels of knowledge per capita, 
have accumulated much faster than countries such as Germany and the US, which were 
starting from a high level of knowledge. The difference between countries is still high, 
however. 
To have a proxy of the elasticity of inputs in the idea production function, we estimate 
equation (3) in logs to obtain the value of the α and 1- α (see Table 2).  
Table 2. The production function of ideas 
Dependent variable Log((dA(t)/A+δ) 
Log(A(t-1) -0.18 
(0.069) 
Log(R&D(t-1)) 0.34 
(0.093) 
Country dummies  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
Observations 300 
Notes: We let α = 0.35. 
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Figure 4: Knowledge per worker in 15 OECD countries, 1973-96
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3.  A growth accounting exercise 
To dig further into the determinants of the different capability of countries to create 
innovation, we first perform an exploratory exercise: as in Hall & Jones (1999), we 
decompose the average creation of new ideas (dA/L) in its main three components: 1) 
expenditure in R&D per worker in R&D, 2) stock of knowledge (patents) per worker in R&D 
and 3) an R&D augmenting productivity factor S: 
α
α δ
−
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ +
1 A(t)
)
L
D(t) & R
  (S =
A(t)   A(t)
 
L L
d
 (4) 
We then perform a growth accounting exercise. Table 3 reports our decomposition of the 
production function for each country and, to make comparisons easier, all terms are expressed 
as a ratio to US values. Interestingly, based on this table, in the ‘production’ of new ‘valuable 
patents’, the EU lags behind the US as the expenditure per worker employed in the R&D 
sector is lower (almost 50% lower than in the US), but also because the stock of accumulated 
knowledge is lower and productivity in the R&D sector is lower. European productivity in the 
R&D sector is not only below the US level, it also shows a high level of heterogeneity among 
countries.
6 Again while some countries such as Finland and Denmark have productivity levels 
close to the US and even higher, that is not the case for the remaining EU countries.  
Table 3. Patent productivity calculation, ratios to US values 
  (dA/L)  (A/L)
 rd/L  S 
  1992-98 1992-98 1992-98 1992-98 
Denmark 0.28  0.16  0.56  1.09 
Finland 0.31  0.19  0.53  1.40 
France 0.21  0.23  0.73  0.32 
Germany 0.34  0.40  0.71  0.56 
Italy 0.22  0.19  0.71  0.41 
Netherlands 0.25  0.32  0.57  0.44 
Norway 0.15  0.12  0.58  0.63 
Spain 0.039  0.031  0.40  0.46 
Sweden 0.24  0.34  0.92  0.51 
UK 0.18  0.28  0.71  0.31 
European avg.  0.23 0.16 0.68 0.61 
Standard dev.  0.11  0.12  0.91  0.61 
US 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Australia 0.15  0.12  0.45  0.65 
Canada 0.47  0.37  0.61  1,20 
Japan 0.59  0.73  0.76  0.64 
US 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Sources: OECD Statistics and author’s calculation. 
                                                 
6 We obtain similar results when we use workers employed in R&D instead of R&D per worker in the patent 
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This exercise should be taken with caution: our results partly depend on the particular form of 
the production function assumed. Also our functional form does not take into consideration 
that countries benefit from the knowledge created by other countries. Hence, our term S might 
well hide the effect of the stock of world knowledge on the production of domestic 
innovation.  
The creation of world knowledge might well play a double role: it pushes the frontiers of 
innovation, making it more difficult to innovate for a country, decreasing the proportion of 
ideas that are really innovative and suitable to be patented internationally. It also fosters the 
creation of new ideas. Hence it is important to understand which of the two effects prevail, 
especially if we want to understand how to foster innovation. In fact if we find out that world 
knowledge and not locally-produced knowledge is more important as an input in the creation 
of innovation, we might prefer not to invest in cutting-edge research and rely more on the 
knowledge produced by the rest of the world. 
When we add the stock of world knowledge as an input in the creation of new ideas and we 
perform a deeper analysis, we obtain interesting results. It turns out, in fact, that indeed a 
long-term relationship exists between a country’s domestic stock of knowledge, domestic 
expenditure in R&D and the rest of the world stock of ideas for each country. In particular we 
can quantify this long-term relationship: a 1% increase in domestic R&D would benefit 
innovation by 0.30%, while an increase of 1% in the stock of foreign ideas increases 
innovation by 0.25%.  
Hence, we find out that domestic R&D and the international stock of knowledge have a 
similar impact on domestic innovation. This is consistent with the estimates of Coe and 
Helpman (1995) and of Kao et al. (1999) who estimate elasticities of productivity to domestic 
and international R&D similar to each other. In fact several studies of R&D spillovers (some 
of them reviewed in Griliches (1990) find that the impact of external R&D on productivity of 
firms or countries is between half as large and 50% larger than the impact of own R&D. Our 
estimates are of the same order of magnitude as the internal effect of R&D are therefore right 
in the same ballpark. 
But what is the dynamics of knowledge when we increase R&D in a country? To answer this 
question, which is relevant for policy decisions, we need to analyse the propagation and the 
impulse response to such shocks in the short run. We adopt an ‘error correction’ 
representation of our dynamic relationship between ln(R&Di,t) and ln(Ai,t): in particular we 
consider the change of each variable as depending on the past changes in the other variables 
as in a VAR in differences, but we include a term that captures the deviation from the 
estimated long-term relationship. 
In order to estimate the co-integration relation between R&D and stock of ideas, we estimate 
the following co-integration equation for 11 European countries: 
ln(Ait−1) = ci + θt + µ log(R&Di,t) +γ log(AROWi,t−1) + εit   (5) 
where ci and θt are a fixed effect and a time trend, respectively. The estimates of parameters µ 
and γ are reported in the Table 4. 
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Table 4. Estimates of the Co-integration Vector 
Dependent variable Log(A(t-1)) 
Log(ARWORLD(t-1)) 0.247** 
(0.068) 
Log(R&D(t-1)) 0.305** 
(0.093) 
Country fixed effect time trend  Yes 
Time trend  Yes 
R
2 0.943 
Number of obs.  220 
Test of co-integration 
Pedroni (1997) 
-2.65** 
Notes: Method of Estimation: Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares with 
country-specific intercepts and common time-trend. Consistent 
standard errors in parenthesis. 
** = significant at 1% confidence level. 
 
We then analyse the impact of a shock to a country’s ln(R&D) resources on its stock of 
knowledge. If we look at the impulse response, Figure 5, we notice that a shock of a 1% 
increase in ln(R&D) affect knowledge with a delay as it takes few periods for these resources 
to generate knowledge. Therefore such positive shocks result in a further increase in R&D 
resources. The increase in knowledge stabilises after 20 years at a level equal to 1.2% (+0.08) 
of the average initial (ln) stock of the country knowledge. The impulse response function 
shows a progressive increase and by the 20
th year, it reaches a plateau.  
 
Figure 5. Impulse Response of Patenting to the Increase in R&D expenditure (in log) 
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4.  R&D, productivity and employment 
We now look at the relation between stock of accumulated knowledge and TFP. Here, we 
want to measure the partial elasticity of the TFPi(t) with respect to Ai(t). As is shown below, 
the estimated elasticity is equal to 0.10. Considering the log-linear form of the TFP function, 
we can write: 
) (t) X (   log + ) A(t) (   log + a ) ) ( ( log i θ β = t TFP i  (6) 
where Xi(t) are country characteristics that could affect productivity. In order to control for 
country- and time-specific factors, we estimate the partial elasticity of TFPi(t) with respect to 
Ai(t) controlling for country and time effects as follows: 
ii log( ( ) b log (A t))  (t) u (t) ii TFP t µ θ =+ + +  (7) 
The estimate of such elasticity b is reported in Table 5 where we have calculated TFP using 
the average countries’ shares for labour and capital income. We employ three-year averages 
of labour adjusted for the accumulation of human capital (we obtain very similar results even 
using unadjusted labour stock). 
As we include country and time dummies, we are sufficiently confident that major cross-
country differences in institutional settings and political institutions are captured by these 
variables, such as common trends towards larger international integration. The elasticity, 
identified is nevertheless significant and equals 0.10. As we fear that the yearly data might 
identify the elasticity on short-term fluctuations, we estimate the parameter with the 
observations averaged over three-year intervals. We take our results as evidence of the 
importance of local innovation in leading to a technological advantage, i.e. that the level of 
knowledge related to innovative activity improve the productivity in the country. Total factor 
productivity is, among other things, also a function of local innovation.  
Table 5. Knowledge and TFP 
Dependent variable TPF 
Log(A(t) 0.10 
(0.0125) 
Country dummies  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes 
R
2 0.9 
Observations 102 
 
Our findings suggest that while R&D workers may ‘stand on the shoulders’ of prior 
(domestic) research, these technical achievements have had only a limited impact on 
measured aggregate productivity. Indeed, there seems to be a gap between the increasing level 
of resources devoted to R&D and the ability of advanced economies to translate these new 
technologies into higher TFP.  
5.  Financing and organising research 
We have learnt that to foster growth and employment, it is necessary to increase productivity 
and investment in R&D. A necessary condition to improve the investment prospects in 
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Commission’s 1993 Green Paper on Innovation), i.e. the inability of European firms to 
translate scientific competence into commercially successful innovations. Two factors may be 
responsible for the ability to translate ideas into growth: the organisation of research and 
entrepreneurship, and its financing.  
5.1  The organisation of research 
That the European problem is not that of a deficiency of scientific competence is reflected, for 
example, in the annual growth rate of its share of both publications and citations in the first 
half of the 1990s: the former was 2.8% for the EU, -0.3% for the US and 2.8% for Japan, 
while the latter was 2.8% for the EU, -0.6% for the US and 0.8% for Japan (European 
Commission, 2000). Yet pure scientific competence does not automatically translate into 
valuable technological ideas.  
Another telling fact emerges from the pattern of patents in high-tech fields. The share of 
patents granted to US and Japanese firms in high-tech fields is higher than their share of all 
patents, as emerges from Table 6 below.  
Table 6. Shares of high-tech patents 
  EPO (1996-98)  USPTO (1993-98) 
  All High-tech all high-tech 
EU-15 
US 
Japan 
46% 
28% 
19% 
35% 
41% 
27% 
16% 
56% 
21% 
12% 
57% 
28% 
Sources: European Commission (2000) and Bottazzi et al. (2004a). 
Another indicator of the unsatisfactory performance of the EU is the ‘technological balance of 
payments’, defined as the balance of payments in high-tech. While the US nearly doubled its 
growth rate in exports between 1990-94 and 1995-98, the EU basically stagnated. 
Table 7. High-tech balance of payments, annual growth rates 
  1990-94 1995-98 
EU-15 
US 
Japan 
10.8% 
8.4% 
11.6% 
12.0% 
15.5% 
-0.5% 
Source: European Commission (2000). 
One possible explanation of these facts lies in the role played by the organisational dimension 
of innovation. Europe is characterised by a relatively large degree of ‘intra-preneurship,’ i.e. 
creation of new businesses within established firms rather than as independent start-ups. This 
contrasts with the US pattern, where the entrepreneurial channel has become particularly 
important with the acceleration of innovative activities and the shortening of product and 
process life-cycles (Baldwin, 1995). 
A link between entrepreneurship and innovation has been documented by Audretsch (1995), 
among others. For the 1976-86 period, he finds that the share of start-ups (new firms) is 
higher in science-based, fast-growing industries (such as chemicals, drugs, communications 
equipment, electronic components, computers and scientific instruments) than in the more 
traditional and stable industries.  R&D AND THE FINANCING OF IDEAS IN EUROPE | 13 
 
These industries are also characterised by higher attrition rates: although there are more 
opportunities for entry by new start-up firms, these come with lower chances of survival.  
European policy-makers have extensively dealt with the obstacles to entrepreneurial activity 
(see the recent European Commission’s ‘Innovation in a Knowledge-based Economy’ 
Communication). The case is often made that the level of entrepreneurship is below its social 
optimum and deserves some attention from policy-makers. Here much has already been said 
(OECD, 1998) but there has been relatively little empirical analysis of the role played by the 
government-policy environment. Research on entrepreneurship has examined the role of 
human capital and financial considerations in the decision to become an entrepreneur. Some 
recent works in the literature have developed some new insights that might be useful to 
consider when setting up a policy agenda:  
•  Competition. It has been shown that the fatality rate of start-ups depends, among other 
things, on the degree of competition of an industry (Acs and Audretch, 1988). Therefore 
competition policy might, although (indirectly), contribute to innovation. A recent paper 
by Aghion et al. (2002) has shown however that there is an optimal level of competition 
that authorities have to enforce if they want to foster innovation. 
•  Intellectual property rights (IPR). The design of property rights is an important 
determinant of the accumulation of entrepreneurial capital (see for example Eaton, 1997). 
The recent discussion regarding the European patent has been an important step towards 
the harmonisation of IPR legislation – a single IPR system favours the commercial 
exploitation of ideas. 
•  Taxation. There are several dimensions along which taxation affects innovation and 
entrepreneurship. One is the degree to which taxation affects the choice between different 
forms of business, such as incorporation versus partnerships. Another is the burden of 
higher labour taxes on labour and non-labour intangible investments. Finally, taxation 
affects the supply of both risk capital and entrepreneurship, especially through capital 
gains tax. Empirical studies on entrepreneurship have focused on personal income tax 
rates, with the expectations that higher tax rates should limit entrepreneurship. Almost all 
studies have, however, found a positive relationship between tax rates and the aggregate 
rate of entrepreneurship and between tax rates and the probability of entrepreneurship 
(Long, 1982 and Scheutze, 2000). The divergence between expectations and results is 
attributed to the perception that being an entrepreneur allows for greater opportunity to 
avoid taxation. Yet Gentry and Hubbard (2000) find that the more progressive a tax 
system is, the less likely an individual will become entrepreneur. Therefore there is not a 
clear, unique, causal relationship between taxes and entrepreneurship. 
•  Regulations and legal barriers. Cumbersome administrative practices make it costly to set 
up a firm. Several OECD studies document a large variation of such costs across countries 
(see OECD, 1998).  
•  Bankruptcy laws. Bankruptcy laws affect the number of entrepreneurs (Berkowitz & 
White, 2002, White, 2001). US bankruptcy laws allow individuals filing for personal 
bankruptcy to exempt some of their assets and income from distribution to their creditors. 
The direct effect of these exemptions is to provide a sort of wealth insurance in the event 
that an entrepreneur fails.  14 | LAURA BOTAZZI 
 
In Europe bankruptcy rules are much more stringent, affecting the choice to become self-
employed. Gromb and Scharfstein (2001), for example, show that the prevalence of 
‘intra-preneurship’ in Europe may also depend on the type of bankruptcy rules.  
•  Financial factors. The view that limited access to credit and financial markets can limit 
the emergence of entrepreneurship is documented empirically. Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1998) show that liquidity constraints affect the choice of becoming self-employed even 
after controlling for individual ability.  
•  Education. Education influences where and how people invest and has an impact on their 
choice to become entrepreneurs. 
All these factors seem relevant and should enter the European policy agenda since they affect 
not only R&D productivity but create an incentive to increase R&D expenditure. 
5.2  The financing of research 
Once ideas are ready to be translated into entrepreneurial firms, these still need finance to 
grow and unfold their growth potential. Availability of financial capital is crucial at this stage. 
Two facets of the European situation seem particularly troubling. One is the lack of financial 
resources available for start-ups, especially for innovative, riskier firms. For smaller and 
younger companies, which rely on external finance in the early stages of their existance, this 
constitutes a serious problem: Guiso (1998) shows that European high-tech companies suffer 
from substantial credit rationing.  
The scarcity of risk capital, and of venture capital in particular, may harm the innovative 
ability of start-ups. Venture capital has been shown to benefit start-ups beyond the supply of 
finance. In other words, there is a ‘soft’ side to venture capital that adds value to the ‘hard’ 
financial side: venture capitalists are often a ‘coach’ for entrepreneurial start-ups (Hellmann, 
2000). In fact, Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) persuasively argue that venture-backed 
companies in the Silicon Valley are faster in developing their products and bringing them to 
market, and need less time to recruit professional management. Similarly, Kortum and Lerner 
(2000) argue that venture-backed companies in Massachussets develop a larger number of and 
more relevant patents than other start-ups.  
There is thus evidence that, at least in the US, venture capital adds to national innovative 
capabilities by affecting both the efficiency of the knowledge production function (more and 
better patents per given inputs) and the overall TFP. There is not such evidence, however, for 
Europe. 
Figures 6 and 7 compare the development of funds raised and invested into venture capital in 
the EU (light bar) and in the US (dark bar) over the 1990s. The histogram suggests that the 
amount of funds raised in Europe between 1995 and 2000 increased nearly twelve-fold. 
Nevertheless, this is not the case since these funds also include funds raised by firms that 
specialise in management buy-out (MBO). These are financing operations that enable 
management to buy out an existing business from its original owner. If we compare the funds 
raised with those invested into venture capital we see that the performance of Europe is less 
striking. R&D AND THE FINANCING OF IDEAS IN EUROPE | 15 
 
Figure 6. Venture capital funds raised in the EU and the US (in millions of US$) 
Source: Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) calculations on EVCA and NVCA data.  
Figure 7. Venture capital investment in the EU and US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) calculations. 
These patterns probably reflect the structural differences that exist between venture capital on 
the two sides of the Atlantic. For instance, the US venture-capital industry has developed over 
half a century and has experienced sustained growth for more than 30 years, whereas venture 
capital has been around in Europe for only two decades.  
Also, another important difference between European and US venture firms is that the latter 
are small independent partnerships that finance themselves mostly from institutional 
investors. In Europe, by contrast, nearly half of the funds come from banks or established 
companies. Such institutional differences translate into different behaviour – as Bottazzi, Da 
Rin and Hellman (2004) have shown. Yet in Europe as well as in US the majority of funds go 
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to expansion investment. Nevertheless, the amount invested in early stage in Europe is almost 
one-fifth of what is invested in the US.  
To understand this phenomenon, in a recent work, Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellman (2004) look 
at micro-disaggregated data and indeed find that the European venture capital sector has a 
professional experience that is not less than that of their American colleagues. Nevertheless, 
venture capitalists are more heterogeneous and less institutionalised than in the US. 
Interestingly, most of the heterogeneity rests in their educational background, which strongly 
influences their investment behaviour. 
Figure 8 shows that more than three-quarters of venture capitalists have a graduate degree. A 
higher business degree is common: about one-third have an MBA. Graduate scientific 
education, while less common, is far from negligible: 11% have a master’s degree in 
engineering or sciences, and over 16% have a Ph.D. Most of the Ph.Ds are in hard sciences.  
Interestingly, even though business education is still relatively young in Europe, Figure 8 
shows that a vast majority of venture capitalists have some. This is largely because of the high 
number of MBAs. What may come as a surprise is that less than one-third actually have an 
education in engineering or science. This suggests that although relatively few, science-
educated partners have a very strong background and can thus contribute to the effectiveness 
of investment decisions. More educated partners with a scientific background broadly seem to 
be taking on a more active role and invest more aggressively in high-tech, early-stage 
companies. 
Overall, human capital is extremely important and needs to be considered as the first place 
where venture capitalists invest and relate their portfolio of companies. As we have seen that 
higher scientific education is becoming a more common feature among European venture 
capitalists, one should probably be positive about the industry’s future ability to play an active 
role in the creation of successful innovative, high-growth companies. 
These findings provide support for the European Commission's stated policy of promoting 
European venture capital. The major action of the Commission in this respect has been the 
transformation of the European Investment Fund (EIF) into a major investor in venture capital 
funds. Nevertheless, it seems that the ‘quality’ of European venture capital should be as 
urgent a concern for the EIF as its sheer ‘quantity’, so as to advance both the size and the 
maturation of the industry.  
Improving the availability of post-graduate education, including executive education or other 
professional training, is likely to have a very positive effect on the level of professionalism in 
the industry. Our results, instead, do not provide support for the European Commission’s 
policy of actively subsidising investment by the venture capitalists. Bottazzi, Da Rin and 
Hellmann (2004) show that almost 24% of the venture capitalists they surveyed in Europe do 
not invest domestically but rather prefer to investment abroad, particularly in the US. This 
finding shows that a subsidy to venture capital investment would end up increasing 
investment in the US and not necessarily in Europe. R&D AND THE FINANCING OF IDEAS IN EUROPE | 17 
 
Figure 8. Venture capitalists’ educational background, by degree qualifications 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has documented that accumulated knowledge, which we measure with the stock of 
‘valuable’ patents, is an important determinant of total factor productivity. In the production 
of these patents the EU is characterised by low productivity and low R&D expenditure 
relative to the US. What appears to explain the lower level of productivity is a relatively lower 
accumulated stock of knowledge per R&D worker and a low R&D expenditure. 
In the attempt to understand these developments this paper moves in two directions: the 
‘organisation’ of innovation and its financing. 
With regard to organisation, the EU has significant scientific competencies (at least when 
compared with the US). These however translate into a smaller and less innovative flow of 
new start-ups. The latter are rarely independent and more often happen within the boundaries 
of a larger established company (‘intra-preneurship’ versus ‘entrepreneurship’). Concerning 
financing, the nature of venture capital in Europe is different from the US. The venture capital 
industry is, contrary to the US, still dominated by banks. 
The outcome is that listed ‘ventured-backed’ companies do not grow faster than ‘non-venture 
backed’ ones. Flows are also limited: from 1995 to 2000 the flow of venture capital 
investments in Europe has increased by a factor of 6, but the gap with the US has become 
larger – there investment has increased, over the same period, by a factor of 24. 
This, however, is not enough to conclude that national innovative capacity is hampered by a 
(venture capital) financing constraint: it could well be that the flow of ideas that look for 
financing is scarce. 
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Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 